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Abstract. During the past fifteen years, Shalom Schwartz developed and continuously refined 
a comprehensive theory on the structure of values. One significant feature of his approach is 
that it does not confine itself to the mere distinction of value types. Rather, building on 
Guttman's facet approach, the theory specifies a set of dynamic relations among values by 
referring to mutual compatibilities and conflicts in the pursuit of the motivational concerns 
that they express. In addition, and more importantly for the present study, Schwartz 
summarised these dynamic relation in terms of a two-dimensional bipolar structure. It is this 
structure which we tried to replicate in our study. Other than Schwartz, however, we did not 
use the 'Schwartz Value Survey' for this purpose. Instead, we applied a short version of 
Morris' 'Ways to Live' developed by Dempsey and Dukes, the 'Kilmann Insight Test', and 
McClelland's 'Personal Values Questionnaire' to a sample of N=144 Canadian marketing 
students. Data were analysed by means of nonmetric multidimensional scaling. Results show 
that many though not all features of the Schwartz values model could be replicated. 
Correspondence with and deviations from the hypothesised structure are discussed, 
considering both conceptual and methodological differences in values assessment. 
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There has been a considerable amount of cross-cultural research on values during the past two 
decades. Many of the respective studies have been influenced by Schwartz’ (1992) values 
theory. Following his theoretical reasoning, values can be classified according to their 
motivational content. All in all, ten different content domains have been conceptually 
distinguished and empirically identified in a multitude of cross-cultural samples (Schwartz, 
1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). However, Schwartz’ approach clearly goes beyond a mere 
nominal distinction of values. Rather, he contends that values are organised dynamically 
according to their mutual compatibilities and incompatibilities. The structure resulting from 
this dynamic organisation can be summarised by a two-dimensional model as shown in Figure 
1. As can be seen, two basic dimensions put up the values space; they are labelled ‘openness 
to change versus conservation’ and ‘self-transcendence versus self-enhancement’ (see 
Schwartz 1992, for more detail). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical model of relations among motivational value
                 types and two basic bipolar value dimensions
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 While the majority of the aforementioned studies on values structure is based on data 
collected with the ‘Schwartz Value Survey’ (SVS; Schwartz, 1992), there is considerable evi-
dence that the organisation of values as postulated by Schwartz is also found with other 
assessment instruments. Thus, former research using the ‘Rokeach Value Survey’ (RVS) 
yielded a configuration which is quite similar to that shown in Figure 1 (Schwartz & Bilsky, 
1987, 1990). More recent studies with a newly developed instrument, the ‘Portraits Question-
naire’ (PQ-29; Schwartz, Lehmann, Melech, Burgess, Harris & Owens, 1998; Bubeck, 1999), 
provided further support to Schwartz’ (1992) approach to values structure. These findings are 
in perfect line with results from reanalysing values data raised with O'Reilly, Chatman & 
Caldwell's (1991) ‘Organizational Culture Profile’ (OCP; cf. Bilsky & Jehn, 1999). Finally, 
there is some indirect evidence that even data collected with Allport and Vernon’s (1931) 
‘Study of Values’ closely match the configuration postulated by his theory (Bilsky & 
Schwartz, 1994). However, in order to validate further the supposed universality of values 
structure, additional studies using a variety of other instruments seem desirable. 
 
  The present paper summarises structural analyses of data relating to three different 
approaches to assessing values: Morris’ (1956) ‘Ways to Live’ as specified by Dempsey and 
Dukes (1966), Kilmann’s ‘Insight Test’ (KIT; Kilmann, 1975), and McClelland’s ‘Personal 
Values Questionnaire’ (PVQ; McClelland, 1991; Langens, 1996). First, these three 
approaches are briefly characterised. Next, our study is outlined in some detail and the results 
of our structural analyses are reported. Finally, these findings are discussed in the light of 
Schwartz’ values theory. 
 
 
Different approaches to assessing values 
 
‘Ways to Live’ 
 Morris (1956) distinguishes three types of values. According to his approach, ‘opera-
tive values’ direct individual behaviour, thus reflecting what the respective person desires 
(dispositional meaning). ‘Conceived values’ represent culturally shared conceptions of 
desirable behaviour (normative meaning). Finally, ‘object values’ characterise the attribution 
of significance or importance to an object or event, independently of individual preferences or 
normative standards (economic meaning). 
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 In order to assess one special kind of conceived values, namely “conceptions of the 
good life“, Morris (1956) developed a special instrument called ‘Ways to Live’. Starting from 
the conception of three basic components of human personality - a Dionysian, a Promethean, 
and a Buddhistic component - he specified seven value profiles. Empirical studies revealed, 
however, that the manifold forms of life could not be covered adequately by these 
alternatives. Therefore, the final version of his instrument was extended in such a way as to 
encompass 13 different conceptions of life. Each of them was described by a relatively 
detailed scenario. Subjects were asked to rank these scenarios according to „the kind of life 
you personally would like to live“ (Morris, 1956, p. 15).  
 
 Despite some conceptual problems relating to the distinction of the ‘desired’ and the 
‘desirable’, Morris’ cross-cultural work was quite positively evaluated (Braithwaite & Scott, 
1991; Kilby, 1993). However, because of the complexity of the different scenarios, applying 
Morris’ ‘Ways to Live’ proved to be rather demanding and time consuming. Furthermore, the 
elaborate descriptions partly concealed the focal points of the various scenarios. To overcome 
these shortcomings, Dempsey and Dukes (1966) developed a short version of this instrument. 
Aside from shortening and simplifying the instrument, these authors also tried to purify the 
vignettes from contradictory or misleading information without changing their central 
meaning at the same time. 
 
 
 The revised version of Morris’ ‘Ways to Live’ served as one out of three instruments 
in our study. In order to investigate whether and to what extent Schwartz’ (1992) two-dimen-
sional model of values structure can be reproduced by means of this research tool, all sce-
narios were classified according to Schwartz’ basic dimensions a priori to empirical analysis. 
Matching was accomplished independently by both authors; the result of this attempt is sum-
marised in Table 1. 
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WAYS TO LIVE 
(Morris, 1956; Dempsey & Dukes, 1966) 
BASIC VALUE DIMENSIONS  
(Schwartz, 1992) 
 
path 6 Master threatening forces by constant      
 practical work 
self-enhancement  
path 3           Show sympathetic concern for others 
path 5           Act and enjoy life through group   
                     participation 
path 13         Let oneself be used by the great cosmic  
                     purpose 
 
 
self-transcendence  
path 1           Appreciate and preserve the best man  
                     has attained 
path 9           Wait in quiet receptivity for joy and 
                     peace 
path 10         Control the self and hold firm to high   
                     ideals 
 
 
conservation  
path 2           Cultivate independence and self- 
                     knowledge  
path 4           Experience festivity and sensuous  
                     enjoyment 
path 7           Admit diversity and accept something  
                     from all ways of life 
path 11         Meditate on the inner life  
path 12         Use the body’s energy in daring and 
                     adventurous deeds 
 
 
 
openness to change 
 
path 8           Enjoy the simple, easily obtainable  
                     pleasure 
hedonism 
 
 Table 1: A priori classification of Morris‘ (1956) „Ways to Live“, as specified by 
Dempsey & Dukes (1966), according to Schwartz‘ (1992) basic value dimensions 
 
 
‘Kilmann Insight Test’    
 
 Kilmann’s (1972, 1975) research relates to ‘interpersonal value constructs’ (IVC). 
These constructs are mental categories „through which an individual perceives and interprets 
the desirable and undesirable features of interpersonal behavior“ (1975, p. 35). In this context, 
values can be conceived of „as more general oughts that transcend any one context“ 
(Kilmann, 1981, p. 941). Aside from theoretical interest however, concentrating on 
interpersonal behaviour followed from pragmatic considerations, too. Thus, Kilmann (1981) 
contends that without addressing some specified realm of behaviour it seems unlikely to 
arrive at a useful concept of values.   
 
 In order to assess ‘interpersonal value constructs’, he constructed a semi-projective 
instrument called the ‘Kilmann Insight Test’ (KIT). In applying the KIT, subjects are asked to 
respond to six moderately ambiguous pictures likely to be related to managerial activities. 
While these pictures closely resemble the material used in Murray’s ‘Thematic Apperception 
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Test’ (TAT), the type of answers elicited from the respondents differs. In fact, subjects work-
ing through the KIT are asked to judge each of the pictures with respect to 18 different values. 
Judgements are made on seven-point scales, ranging from ‘not relevant’ to ‘extremely rele-
vant’.  
 
 The KIT-items used for rating the six pictures were taken from Rokeach’s (1973) 
work. More precisely, Kilmann referred to the 18 instrumental values of the ‘Rokeach Values 
Survey’ (RVS). The respective RVS-items, however, were partly reformulated in such a way 
as to include only nouns in the final values list of the KIT. As with Morris ‘Ways to Live’, the 
KIT-items were classified according to Schwartz’ basic value dimensions (see Table 2). In 
this case, matching was accomplished by referring to a former study in which Rokeach’s 
instrumental values had been analysed (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994). 
 
 
INTERPERSONAL CONSTRUCTS 
(Kilmann, 1975) 
BASIC VALUE DIMENSIONS 
(Schwartz, 1992) 
ambition 
capability 
intellect 
logic 
 
self-enhancement 
affection 
broadmindedness 
forgivingness 
helpfulness 
honesty 
responsibility 
 
 
self-transcendence 
obedience 
orderliness 
politeness 
self-control 
 
conservation 
courage 
imagination 
independence 
 
openness to change 
cheerfulness hedonism 
  
Table 2:  A priori classification of Kilmann’s (1975) „Interpersonal constructs“ according    
to Schwartz‘ (1992) basic value dimensions 
 
 
‘Personal Values Questionnaire’ 
 
 In his work on human motivation, McClelland (1987; McClelland & Weinberger, 
1990; McClelland, Koestner & Weinberger, 1989) distinguishes two kinds of motives: 
Implicit motives are based on a limited number of biological needs. Explicit motives, in 
contrast, are self-attributed needs which are „usually activated by explicit, often social, 
incentives such as rewards, prompts, expectations, or demands“ (McClelland, Koestner & 
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Weinberger, 1989, p. 693). According to McClelland, the former type of motives is accessible 
to indirect, projective methods only. Explicit motives, on the other hand, are cognitively 
elaborated and can be adequately assessed by means of questionnaires and self-reports, 
therefore. 
 
 One instrument for measuring explicit motives is the ‘Personal Values Questionnaire’ 
(PVQ). This tool was developed by McClelland and his collaborators and has been employed 
since then in some more recent studies on motivation (McClelland, 1991; Langens, 1996). 
Following McClelland’s conceptual distinction, explicit motives closely match the values 
concept as used by other researchers. In fact, values are directly referred to in the instruction 
and in further comments on this instrument: „Values are those factors - activities, behaviors, 
qualities, beliefs, goals - that you believe are important to do, follow, or strive toward. While 
you may not always think about your values, you are aware of them and can consciously 
identify them“ (McClelland, 1991, p. 4) 2. 
 
 Other than instruments usually employed in values research, however, the PVQ is not 
designed to cover the whole values domain. Rather it serves for measuring three explicit mo-
tives which are in the focus of many, if not most, motivational studies: achievement, 
affiliation and power. These motives reflect only one of the two basic dimensions of the 
Schwartz model, i.e. ‘self-transcendence versus self-enhancement’ (see Table 3). Each of 
these motives is measured by 10 items requiring subjects to rate their subjective importance 
on a six-point scale ranging from ‘not important to me’ to ‘extremely important to me’. In 
addition to these 30 items, the PVQ includes six fillers. 
 
ITEMS 
McClelland (1991) 
BASIC VALUE DIMENSIONS 
Schwartz (1992) 
achievement     2, 5, 7, 10, 13, 18, 22, 27, 32, 34 
power               3, 8, 14, 16, 17, 21, 24, 28, 30, 36 
 
self-enhancement 
affiliation         1, 6, 9, 12, 19, 23, 26, 31, 33, 35  self-transcendence 
  
 Table 3:  A priori classification of McClelland’s (1991) „Personal Values Questionnaire“      
according to Schwartz‘ (1992) basic value dimensions 
 
 
Method 
 
 The procedure used for testing the universality of Schwartz' (1992) values taxonomy - 
independently of the instruments applied for assessing value preferences - closely followed 
major trends in analysing value structures in cross-cultural research during the past two 
                                                 
2  Langens, personal communication November 13, 1998 (M.K.) 
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decades (Levy 1986, 1990, Meyer & Ruegg, 1979, Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Thus, two 
consecutive steps had to be taken. First and a priori to empirical analysis, all items of the 
respective instrument were assigned to Schwartz’ basic dimensions according to their 
motivational content. Provided that this task was accomplished successfully, this a priori 
assignment had to be confirmed in a second step. This was accomplished  by examining 
whether and to what extent the spatial representation of empirical values data fitted the 
Schwartz model (Figure 1). As to the first step, Tables 1 - 3 summarise the classification of 
value items employed in our study. It should be mentioned that, other than with the KIT- and 
PVQ-items, classification of Morris’ ‘Ways to Live’ caused considerable problems; thus, 
depending on the perspective taken, the descriptions of several paths (e.g. 6 and 13) may 
suggest a different focus. Both, the procedure and the results of the second, empirical step are 
outlined next. 
 
Sample 
 Our study was realised at the University of Manitoba during October 1998 by the 
second author3. On the whole, 144 Canadian students participated in this research. Age varied 
between 17 and 33 years with a mean of 21.2. Sex was nearly equally distributed in our 
sample, including 74 male and 70 female students. All participants were enrolled in marketing 
or related subjects. 
 
 Students completed the three assessment instruments during class sessions. To control 
for order effects, presentation was balanced by using six sequences of the instruments. 
 
Data analysis 
 Schwartz’ theoretical work on the structure of values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987, 1990) started from considerations which were closely tied to Facet Theory (c.f. 
Canter, 1985). This meta-theoretical approach to research is supplemented by a bundle of 
procedures for data analysis, including non-metric multidimensional scaling (MDS). Since 
former research on values structure mostly relied on this latter procedure, structural analyses 
reported here were accomplished be means of non-metric MDS, too, in order to facilitate 
comparisons with other studies (for additional analyses using PCA, cf. Koch, 1999). 
 
 According to the central question of whether the different approaches considered in 
this study yield value structures that correspond to Schwartz’ taxonomy, each of the three data 
sets collected with the ‘Ways to Live’, ‘Kilmann Insight Test’, and ‘Personal Values 
Questionnaire’, respectively, was analysed separately by MDS. Analyses were based on 
Pearson correlation matrices (Borg & Groenen, 1997). Additional MDS, including two or 
three different data sets at a time, were run to find out whether value data could be 
represented by joint structures as well. Computations were realised with version 5.0 for 
Windows of the SYSTAT program package. 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to Malcolm C. Smith who kindly supported our research 
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Results 
‘Ways to Live’. A two-dimensional MDS of Dempsey and Dukes’ (1966) short version of 
Morris’ ‘Ways to Live’ yielded a coefficient of alienation of .26. The corresponding Shepard-
Diagram did not reveal any anomalies indicative of a degenerate solution. Figure 2 shows the 
plot of the respective MDS. 
 
 
 As can be seen, the arrangement of the thirteen ways results in a circumplex. Yet, this 
structure does not reflect the expected form postulated by the Schwartz model (Figure 1). 
Thus, self-enhancement (path 6) and self-transcendence (paths 3, 5, and 13) - as specified in 
our a priori classification (Table 1) - show up at the right hand side of the plot, while the 
openness- (paths 2, 4, 7, 11, and 12) and conservation-items (paths 1, 9, and 10) are located 
left. Quite obviously, however, a clear separation of conservation and self-transcendence from 
openness and self-enhancement emerged, as indicated by the straight line in Figure 2. We will 
come back to this finding in our discussion. 
 
Figure 2: "Ways to Live" - 2-dimensional SSA
path 10
path 11
path 7
path 4
path 2
path 6
path 5
path 1
path 8path 9
path 13
path 3path 12
Dimension 1
D
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en
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 conservation              +                 self-transcendence
 openness                   +                   self-enhancement
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 Supplementary to this two-dimensional solution, a three-dimensional was scrutinised, 
too. While the coefficient of alienation (.15) pointed to some improvement of the resulting 
split (Borg & Groenen, 1997), the three-dimensional configuration did not offer any 
information beyond the former one. 
 
 
‘Kilmann Insight Test’. As before, data from the ‘Kilmann Insight Test’ were analysed by a 
two-dimensional MDS, resulting in a coefficient of alienation of .20. Again, the Shepard-
Diagram did not suggest any anomalies of the two-dimensional solution. The resulting plot is 
shown in Figure 3. Items whose location deviates from our a priori classification (see Table 2) 
are printed in italics. Despite these ‘dislocations’ the basic values structure could be 
reconstructed quite well. 
Figure 3: "Kilmann Insight Test" - 2-dimensional SSA
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‘Personal Values Questionnaire’. PVQ-items again were submitted to a two-dimensional 
MDS. Scaling yielded a coefficient of alienation of .21. As with the other instruments, the 
Shepard-Diagram revealed no anomalies. It is evident from Figure 4, that all 30 items could 
be separated according to the a priori classification. When inspecting this plot, it should be 
kept in mind that the PVQ contains items that represent only one of the two basic dimensions 
of Schwartz’ values model, i.e., ‘self-transcendence versus self-enhancement’. 
 
 
 Joint analyses. Multidimensional scaling of either two or all three sets of value data at a time 
always resulted in a clear split of assessment methods. In contrast, separation of value items 
as predicted by our a priori classification turned out successful in only one case: ‘self-
enhancement versus self-transcendence’ could be clearly split in a three dimensional MDS of 
the KIT- and PVQ-items on dimensions 2 x 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: "Personal Values Questionnaire" - 2-dimensional SSA
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Discussion 
 
 At first glance, the results of our study look mixed. While multidimensional scaling of 
McClelland’s (1991) ‘Personal Values Questionnaire’ yields a perfect separation of values 
along Schwartz’ ‘self-enhancement versus self-transcendence’-dimension, results concerning 
the ‘Kilmann Insight Test’ (Kilmann, 1975) and Dempsey and Duke's (1966) 'Ways to Live' 
seem less clear. 
  
 In fact, five out of 18 values of Kilmann's (1975) instrument did not appear in the 
predicted region. However, the basic values structure showed up as hypothesised by 
Schwartz’ (1992) taxonomy. Furthermore, we know from cross-cultural research that 
deviations from the ‘ideal’ values structure do occur. 'Independence', for instance, happened 
to show up close to 'self-enhancement' in several other studies, too (cf. Schwartz & Sagiv, 
1995). In addition, 'self-control' and 'responsibility', though usually indicators for 
'conservation' and 'self-transcendence', may quite reasonably be supposed to change their 
connotative meaning towards 'self-enhancement' when investigated (a) in a managerial setting 
as suggested by the instrument applied (KIT), and (b) in a selective sample like the one used 
in our study (subjects from marketing and related fields). 
  
 While the displacement of several items of the Kilmann instrument may be 
attributable to the managerial context induced by the KIT, the misfits observed in Dempsey 
and Duke’s (1966) ‘Ways to Live’ seem to be a challenge to the structural approach 
underlying our analyses. However, the evaluation of this finding, too, proves to be more 
complex than a direct comparison of our a priori classification (Table 1) with the circumplex 
(Figure 2) may suggest. As mentioned before, we ran into considerable problems when trying 
to classify several of the 13 ‘Ways to Live’. Thus, with regard to path 6, it is by no means 
clear that this vignette does in fact represent ‘self-enhancement’. Rather, reference to 
‘controlling the world’ and to ‘threatening forces’ may as well be indicative of the 
‘conservation’-pole of the two-dimensional model. Similarly, why not interpret path 13 in 
terms of ‘conservation’ (or, more specifically, ‘tradition’) instead of ‘self-transcendence’? It 
is probably at least partly in the eye of the beholder which of the different descriptive terms 
convey the (supposed) core idea of this vignette. Taken seriously, these considerations mean, 
that the ‘Ways to Live’ - whether operationalised by Morris (1956) or by Dempsey and Dukes 
(1966) - may not adequately cover the two-dimensional space of human values as 
hypothesised by Schwartz. Instead, they seem to be clearly biased towards ‘openness to 
change versus conservation’. 
  
 This latter interpretation seems to be in line with our joint analyses, too. As may be 
remembered, only the combined MDS of McClelland's 'Personal Values Questionnaire' 
(PVQ) and the 'Kilmann Insight Test' (KIT) resulted in a partition of value items according to 
motivational content. All other analyses, whether applied to two or to all three instruments, 
showed but a methods' split. These findings appear less surprising when considering results 
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from the following perspectives: (a) Only two of our instruments, the PVQ and the KIT, 
clearly overlap with respect to motivational content as defined by Schwartz' (1992) basic 
value dimensions. These instruments mainly include items that are indicative of the first 
dimension, i.e., 'self-transcendence versus self-enhancement'. In contrast, the 'Ways to Live' 
show a dominant orientation towards Schwartz' second dimension 'openness to change versus 
conservation'. (b) All three instruments widely differ with respect to item format. Thus, 
subjects are supposed to rank vignettes in Dempsey and Duke's 'Ways to Live', while asked to 
rate semiprojective pictures as opposed to ordinary statements in Kilmann's and McClellands 
instruments, respectively. Given a poor motivational overlap of instruments in all but one of 
our joint analyses and the distinctive features of item format at the same time, a general 
separation of motivational domains could hardly be expected. Rather, a methods' split was 
likely to show up. 
 
 Viewed this way, our findings are not a challenge to the universality of the two-
dimensional values' structure hypothesized by Schwartz (1992). They suggest instead, that (a) 
the instruments applied in our study represent the basic value dimensions to a different 
degree, (b) on condition that instruments have motivational elements in common, structural 
analyses are likely to reveal value structures as suggested by Schwartz' (1992) theory, and (c) 
method factors may dominate structural analyses otherwise. 
  
 Of course, a single study is not sufficient for validating or disvalidating a theoretical 
approach. In so far, our findings should not be considered isolated when judging the pros and 
cons of a universal values structure. Furthermore, the empirical setting as well as the sample 
under study must be taken into account. However, taken together with former findings from 
structural analyses of the Rokeach Value Survey (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990), the 
Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995), the Portraits Questionnaire (Schwartz et 
al., 1998), the Organisational Culture Profile (Bilsky & Jehn, 1999) or the Study of Values 
(Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994), the present results seem quite encouraging to stick to the idea of a 
universal structure of values, and to investigate this structure in some more detail. All in all, 
findings from this study may be taken as evidence for the heuristic utility of Schwartz' (1992) 
theoretical approach to the structure of values. 
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